For several years, I have been concerned about some combat actions that took place on Goi Noi Island in Sept. 1968. I first became concerned when I reviewed a rough draft of "1968, The Definitive Year" being prepared by the Marine Corps involving historical data of the war in Vietnam. I recall reading the draft, an excerpt of which is contained in "The Declaration of David J. Sconyers" enclosed in the download part of his e-mail.

As stated, the excerpt is incorrect and the declaration of David Sconyers concerning the recovery of the two undestroyed LVT's that were abondoned is correct.

The fact that I did not correct the draft of "!968 The Definitive Year" was a mistake on my part since I was ,at the time of the incident, the Battalion Commander of the 3rd LVT Battalion and had specfic recall of the incident. At the time I read the draft, about mid 1980's, I did not know what effect my correcting the draft would have on the events of Go Noi Island as concerns the abandonmentand recovery of the LVT's left behind by the 5th Marines. I did not know of the where abouts of Dave Sconyers or Steve Day and since there was a deadline on the review period, I regrettably did nothing.

Susequently, in telephone conversations with Dave Sconyers, I feel that the record of the Go Noi Island should be corrected and that those involved should be recognized for the actions involving the recovery of the two abondoned LVT's.

The following is narrative summary of the events that took place at that time that involved me as the Battalion Commander.

The period from 23 August to approximately the 12 of September 1968, was an involved heavy combat period for the 3rd LVT Battalion. It involved a period of 9 days when the Battalion was at full alert and considerable enemy engagements took place in and around the Marble Mountains. As concerns a brief description of the enemy actions in our area. The Green Beret Camp, just north of 3rd Amtracs suffered 17 USA KIA's (Killed in Action) and 32 Nung Mercenaries also KIA. 52 others of the Green Beret Camp were evacuted for wounds. 3rd Amtracs also had casualities, all except one took place outside the contonment area. There were many VC/NVA killed during this engagement and a great deal of enemy ordnance captured ( An account of the combat that took place during this period can be read under "Sapper Attack Repulsed" at the following web site.. SAPPER ATTACK REPULSED. The story of the Sapper Attack accurately describes the combat going on at the Marble Mountains at that time.

During this period of late August and early Sept. of 1968, information of an impending typhoon was made known to us. At the same time, information from Lt. Steve Day indicated an operation in support of Operation Sussex Bay was being planned and would involve a number of 3rd Amtrac LVT's. Because of the combat actions ongoing around the Marble Montains at that time, I spent most of my time in the COC bunker following the the daily and nightime combat activities. I was therefore aware of the information being reported by Lt Day and was well aware that Go Noi Island was no place for LVT's during a typhoon. It was an island just barely above the high water mark of the river on both sides of the Island. I remember messages being sent to Lt Day suggesting that, in the strongest of words, he recommend to the Regimental S-3 of the 5th Marines, cancellation of the use of LVT's if the typhoon was to come ashore. As it appeared that this recommendation was not being accepted, I recall 4 messages being prepared and sent to the Regimental S-3 and to the Regimental Commander, Colonel Paul Graham under my name...all of which repeated that the use of LVT's would be in jeopardy. Inspite of these warnings, the operation proceeded.

The following is a letter I wrote to my wife on 9 Sept:

"Things have been moving along pretty fast and we have been very involoved. I think the last time I wrote was during the typhoon and since then, I haven't had a minute. The camp didn't get too much damage--quite a few roofs blew away..but the electricity form the generators held up. The wind really did blow..over 60 mph and the rain came in horizontally..everything was flooded including COC. The threat of the VC/NVA's was still around so I moved many LVT's out to the perimeter to provide the troops some cover..but it was miserable. The typhoon came ashore below HUE..about 30 miles from here. Between us and HUE is a high mountain range and whether or not that helped us, I don't know. The rain did run down the mountains and caused all the rivers to overflow and of course, all the rice paddies are filled to look like a big lake. During the typhoon, I had 4 LVT's with "A" Company working on Go Noi Island as part of Allenbrook. On Thursday, they were 16 miles from An Hoa when the rain started. The river overflowed and the infantry regimental commander decided to abandon the vehicles. The CG was quite concerned over this over this as there were 4 tanks down there. On Friday, myself and the Tank Battalion Commander( Lt Col Maurice Ashley) flewdown to Go Noi and we located all the vehicles. Two of my LVT's had already been blown up by Charlie and 2 were way out on the end of the island..well mired in mud. I came up with a plan with my staff to get two of them out and spent all day Saturday at Div Hqts. making arrangements. Yesterday, I borrowed a gun ship from the Green Berets and went back and this morning two were out the mud and if all goes well, we may have them off the island before night.The other two were blown by Charlie--nothing left to salvage. During the time we were flying down there, we could see Charlie all over the place and had a field day shooting at him from the helicopters. One of the helicopters was hit by small arms fire, but no damage..

Anyway, it has been one of times I soon won't forget and although you may be angry at my lack of letters--I can assure you that it has not been intentional. I plan to move John Keegan over as XO and give me some slack..as there is just too much to do..."

The actual rescue of the vehicles is accurately described by Dave Sconyers and Steve Day. It was a herculean leadership effort that ended in saving two LVT's .. I cannot say enough about the heroic actions of all involved..under the most difficult of circumstances.

Subsequently, I requested to see General Youngsdale about this whole matter and to report my side of the story. After a meeting of all the Commanders at Division Hdqs. I did meet with the General and Colonel Graham to explain my position on the destroyed LVT's. I informed the General of my message traffic and warnings concerning the capabilities of the LVT's during a typhoon and that these warnings were ignored. Nothing came of this meeting except that Colonel Graham caused me considerable problems later on.. which I'm sure stemmed from my putting him on report.

I would like to see whatever can be done to recognize the role of the recovery of two LVT's as described by Dave Sconyers and Steve Day. I am in position to recommend them for a belated Bronze Star based upon my personal knowledge and leadership role in this incident.

Semper Fi...Frank "Stub" Chace
3rd Amtrac, Commanding Officer..RVN 1968